From CureFit to Cult.fit — A Decade of Ambition, Rebranded
In 2016, Mukesh Bansal incorporated a company called CureFit Healthcare with a vision so broad it barely fit on a pitch deck. The plan was to build a fully integrated health and wellness giant — one that would handle everything from physical fitness and nutrition to core medical care, all under one roof.
A decade later, the medical piece quietly faded into the background. What emerged instead was something more focused but no less ambitious: an organised fitness platform that had scaled to 708 centres across 77 Indian cities, serving nearly one million paying members, with a mobile app connecting gym memberships to retail sales of treadmills and activewear.
In April 2026, CureFit Healthcare retired its old corporate name entirely and rebranded as Cult.fit Limited — a moment that formalised what had been true for years. Everything in the group now carries the Cult name and its distinctive Vitruvian Man logo.
The timing of the rebranding wasn't coincidental. It preceded the company's DRHP filing with SEBI, setting the stage for India's most-watched fitness sector IPO.
The IPO — What's Being Offered and Why Now
Cult.fit's IPO comprises two components. A fresh issue of ₹950 crore will be raised by the company itself to fund expansion. Alongside it, an Offer for Sale of up to 17.8 crore shares will allow early investors — including founder Mukesh Bansal — to partially exit their positions.
The fresh issue will not be used to repay debt or fund operational losses. Every rupee has been allocated to specific purposes: approximately ₹277 crore for setting up new Cult Elite and Cult Neo fitness centres, ₹218 crore for lease and licence payments on existing company-operated gyms, with the remainder split between loan repayments, marketing spend, and opening new Cultsport retail stores.
Two caveats worth noting. Not every new gym location has been finalised, and not every lease has been signed. The expansion plan carries inherent execution risk that public market investors will need to evaluate against management's track record of opening and operating centres at scale.
The Business Model — Two Engines, One App
Understanding Cult.fit requires understanding that it is not simply a gym chain. It operates a dual-revenue model that has no precise equivalent among listed Indian consumer companies.
Fitness services — gym memberships, personal training, corporate wellness programmes — contribute approximately 70% of total revenue.
Products — treadmills, activewear, yoga mats, recovery gear under the Cultsport brand — contribute the remaining 30%.
The connective tissue is the Cult mobile app. When a member signs up for a gym membership, the app actively cross-sells retail products. The strategy is working: approximately one-third of active fitness members now purchase physical products through the platform. This cross-sell rate turns what could be a straightforward physical gym business into something more resembling a consumer ecosystem — where every gym relationship becomes a doorway into recurring retail revenue.
Revenue has roughly doubled in two years. Total consolidated revenue grew from ₹927 crore in FY24 to ₹1,721 crore in FY26. Adjusted EBITDA turned positive. The fitness services segment is comfortably profitable at the operating level.
Why Cult.fit Is Still Losing Money Despite a Million Members
The profitability picture is where the story gets complicated.
Despite a million members and ₹1,721 crore in revenue, Cult.fit reported a net loss of ₹252 crore in FY26. The explanation lies in the economics of running a nationwide physical gym network.
Every new centre that opens comes loaded with fixed costs that hit the income statement immediately: depreciation on gym equipment, finance charges, employee stock compensation expenses, and substantial lease obligations that are locked in for years regardless of how quickly new centres ramp up to full occupancy.
Lease costs alone accounted for nearly 9% of total expenses in FY26. The company spent over ₹90 crore on company-owned gym leases and another ₹90 crore on warehouses, offices, and retail stores — before spending a rupee on trainers, electricity, maintenance, or marketing.
The other factor is the subsidy nature of some subsidiary operations. Certain group companies continue to generate cash losses that require fresh capital infusion from the parent, either through corporate loans or equity top-ups. As long as these subsidiaries underperform, Cult.fit has to divert operating cash flow away from expansion and toward their sustenance.
The Geographic Concentration Problem
Cult.fit's scale is real, but its revenue concentration is striking. Despite operating over 700 fitness centres across 77 cities, more than 90% of fitness services revenue in FY26 came from just four metropolitan areas — Delhi-NCR, Mumbai, Bengaluru, and Hyderabad.
This creates an important question for the IPO narrative. If the bull case for Cult.fit depends on replicating its metro success across Tier-2 and Tier-3 India — which is where the next 300 million potential fitness members live — then the company needs to demonstrate that the economics of a Cult centre in Lucknow, Coimbatore, or Indore are as strong as they are in Gurugram or Andheri.
Those are genuinely different markets. Average consumer spending, willingness to pay a premium for branded fitness, propensity to buy Cultsport equipment, and competitive intensity from local gyms all vary significantly outside the top four metros. The expansion plan's success depends entirely on getting these variables right in cities where Cult.fit currently has limited operating history.
The Asset-Light Shift — Franchising as the Profitability Lever
Management's answer to the capital-intensity problem is a deliberate pivot toward an asset-light franchise model for new location expansion.
Rather than building company-owned centres that require heavy upfront investment in fit-outs and equipment, the plan is to recruit franchise partners who own the physical infrastructure while Cult.fit provides the brand, the app platform, the training curriculum, and the supply chain for products. The franchise partner bears the construction and equipment cost. Cult.fit earns management fees and product sales without the corresponding capital outlay.
Alongside this, management has identified four other levers to drive the business toward net profitability. Corporate memberships — where companies buy bulk subscriptions for employee wellness — carry higher margins and longer contract tenures than individual memberships, reducing the customer acquisition cost that drags on per-member economics. Localised manufacturing for Cultsport products would reduce import dependence and improve product margins. Retail expansion through dedicated Cultsport stores would capture fitness product demand from consumers who don't have an active gym membership. And continued deepening of the app ecosystem — more cross-selling, more personalised content, more digital services — would increase revenue per member without proportional increase in physical infrastructure cost.
Each of these levers is strategically coherent. The question, as always with pre-profitability consumer platforms, is execution speed and consistency.
The Competitive Landscape — Who Cult.fit Is Up Against
India's organised fitness market is genuinely underpenetrated — estimated gym membership penetration sits below 1% of the population compared to 15-20% in developed markets — which creates the growth runway that underpins Cult.fit's entire expansion thesis.
But the market is no longer uncrowded. Gold's Gym, Anytime Fitness, and Snap Fitness operate franchise models across India. Regional chains have been expanding in every major market. And on the digital side, apps offering on-demand workout content at ₹500 per month compete for the consumer who might otherwise join a Cult gym.
Cult.fit's sustainable competitive advantages — if it has them — lie in the combination of physical presence and digital engagement that pure-play digital competitors cannot replicate, and the brand equity that national gym chains with weaker tech infrastructure can't match. The Cult app, the trainer community, and the brand recognition built through years of IPL-level marketing investment are real assets. But they are assets that need to convert into financial performance to justify an IPO valuation.
Valuation — What Are Investors Actually Paying For?
The DRHP does not disclose a specific valuation, and the price band will only be announced closer to the subscription window. But based on pre-IPO market transactions and the implied enterprise value from the fresh issue size, industry observers place Cult.fit's implied valuation in the ₹7,000-9,000 crore range.
At ₹1,721 crore in FY26 revenue, that implies a price-to-sales multiple of roughly 4-5x — a premium to most listed consumer services companies, justified only by the growth trajectory and the potential of the asset-light franchise model to significantly expand margins from current levels.
The most honest framing of what investors are buying: not current profitability, which doesn't exist yet at the net level, but optionality on a market that is at 1% penetration in a country with 1.4 billion people, run by the only national fitness brand with a working digital-physical ecosystem.
That is a compelling long-term thesis. It is not a compelling short-term earnings story. Investors who buy Cult.fit at IPO are making a three-to-five year bet on category creation and franchise economics — not a 12-month bet on reported profit growth.
What to Watch After Listing
Franchise mix versus company-owned mix. Every quarter, watch what percentage of new centre openings are franchise versus company-owned. A rising franchise share means the capital-light model is gaining traction and profitability is structurally improving.
Loss per member trajectory. Divide net losses by total paying members to get a rough sense of how much Cult.fit is subsidising each customer's experience. This metric should improve as scale grows and the franchise mix increases.
Tier-2 city economics. When the company discloses city-wise or tier-wise revenue data in post-listing quarterly results, watch whether Tier-2 contribution is growing and whether the margins at new centres outside the top four metros are comparable to the metro business.
Cultsport retail as a percentage of revenue. The product business carries better gross margins than gym memberships and scales with lower physical infrastructure. A rising Cultsport contribution is a margin-positive signal.
Corporate membership growth. High-margin, multi-year corporate wellness contracts are the most durable revenue in the fitness business. Watch this metric for signs of whether Cult.fit is building institutional revenue alongside its consumer business.
The Honest Verdict
Cult.fit is unambiguously the leader in India's organised fitness market. The network of 708 centres, the million members, the working cross-sell ecosystem, and the brand recognition accumulated through a decade of heavy investment represent a genuine platform that would be difficult and expensive to build from scratch.
But it is a platform that is still pre-profitability at the net level, heavily concentrated in four cities, entering an IPO at a moment when early investors and the founder are taking money off the table, and relying on a franchise model pivot that has been announced but not yet demonstrated at scale.
The Cult.fit IPO is, ultimately, a bet on whether India's fitness market will develop the way its most optimistic advocates believe it will — with penetration rising meaningfully over the next decade, with consumers in Tier-2 cities willing to pay ₹1,500-2,000 per month for a branded fitness experience, and with the franchise model delivering the margin expansion that the company's own operating history has not yet been able to produce.
Those bets may all pay off. The category is real, the market is large, and the company's leadership position is genuine. But public markets, unlike venture capital, eventually demand evidence rather than potential. Cult.fit's most important task in the first four quarters after listing will be demonstrating, through actual numbers rather than aspirational guidance, that the healthy business is not just in the app and the gym — it is also in the balance sheet.
